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whether the intent of the statute is that all accessories after the fact be
included and equally punishable with those who, with perhaps a lesser
degree of culpability, hinder the administration of justice.
Claude M. McQuarrie,III

FAMILY LAW-Voluntary.Legitimation-Father Has No
Absolute Right To Legitimate Child Solely on
Proof of Biological Fatherhood
In re K,
535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1976).
In April 1974, an unwed mother gave birth to a baby girl and subsequently relinquished her parental rights to the Neuces County Child Welfare Unit
of the State Department of Public Welfare. In order to proceed with
adoption arrangements, the Child Welfare Unit initiated legal proceedings to
terminate the parent-child relationship, to afford the father an opportunity to
be heard, and to have itself appointed as managing conservator of the child.
The child's natural father, S.D.A., after being served with citation, filed a
petition for voluntary legitimation of the baby and for his appointment as
managing conservator. The trial court found the father to be unfit to act as
parent of the child and denied his petition for voluntary legitimation. The
Corpus Christi Court of Civil Appeals affirmed.' On appeal, S.D.A.
contended that denial of his petition was a violation of the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution.
Held-Affirmed. An unwed father is entitled to notice of any proceeding
which affects the parent-child relationship; he may file a petition to voluntarily legitimate the child and thereby acquire the opportunity to secure all
parental rights and duties. 2 It is within the discretion of the trial judge,
however, to deny the petition, if to do so would be in the best interests of the
child.8
be specified, such as knowledge of commission of a crime, knowledge of a formal accusa-

tion, knowledge of an informal accusation, or reason to believe a crime has been committed. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 205.50, .60, .65 (,McKinney 1975) provide an excellent
example of such a refinement in this area.

1. In re K, 520 S.W.2d 424, 429 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1975), a! 'd,
535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1976).

2. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. 1976).
3. Id. at 170.
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At early common law an illegitimate child was said to be filius nullius, the
child of no one, 4 and a natural parent's right to legitimate the child did not
exist until more progressive cases were decided.5 Until recently, in Texas
an unwed father was under no duty to support his illegitimate offspring.6
While an illegitimate child's constitutional right to the same substantial
benefits as are given to legitimate children has been firmly established,7 an
unwed father's parental rights remain limited.8 Prior to 1972, the majority
of jurisdictions failed to recognize any special relationship between an unwed
father and his illegitimate children and withheld many parental rights, such
as visitation and custody.9
In Stanley v. Illinois,' ° the Supreme Court rendered a landmark decision
recognizing the unwed father's right to due process with regard to proceedings concerning custody of his illegitimate children." The Illinois courts
had denied Stanley a hearing to determine his fitness to retain custody of his
children based on their interpretation of a statutory definition of "parent"
which excluded an unwed father. The statute allowed the state to circumvent neglect proceedings required to remove children from the custody of
"parents" and thereby created a presumption of unfitness in unwed fathers. 2 The Supreme Court found that the father's private interest in his
child warranted constitutional protection, absent a powerful countervailing
state interest, and that one's right to conceive and raise children was
essential, basic, and more precious than property rights; furthermore, this
right was not dependent on the marital status of the parents.' 3 While the
Court recognized the need to preserve the state's interest in protecting the
4. H. CLARK, THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES § 5.1, at
155 (1968).
5. See Nichols v. Stewart, 15 Tex. 226, 232-33 (1855); Hartwell v. Jackson, 7
Tex. 576, 580 (1852).

6. Home of the Holy Infancy v. Kaska, 397 S.W.2d 208, 210 (Tex. 1965).
7. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973). Once a state has recognized the
right of a child to receive financial support from its parents it cannot deny financial
support to an illegitimate child. Id. at 538; cf. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72
(1968) (illegitimate children allowed to collect damages for wrongful death of their
mother). The UNIFORM PARENTAGE AcT §§ 1-2 puts the illegitimate child on equal
terms with the legitimate child with regard to all rights, duties, and privileges.
8. See generally Tabler, Paternal Rights in the Illegitimate Child: Some Legitimate Complaints on Behalf of the Unwed Father, 11 J. FAMILY L. 231, 242 (1971);
Comment, The Putative Father'sRights After Roe v. Wade, 6 ST. MARY'S L.J. 407, 412
(1974).
9. See, e.g., DePhillips v. DePhillips, 219 N.E.2d 465, 466 (Ill. 1966) (custody and
visitation); Jolly v. Queen, 142 S.E.2d 592, 595-96 (N.C. 1965) (custody); Thomas v.
Children's Aid Society, 364 P.2d 1029, 1031 (Utah 1961) (custody).
10. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
11. See id. at 658.
12. Id. at 650, citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-14 (1972), which defines "parents" as "the father and mother of a legitimate child . . . or the natural mother of an
"
illegitimate child ....
13. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
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welfare of the minor and the best interests of the community, it held that the

denial of a fitness hearing was a violation of due process and of the equal
protection clause. 1 4 Thus, the Court was evaluating the means used to
preserve what otherwise would have been a valid state interest. 15 Since the
State had the power to remove children from the custody of unfit parents,
if Stanley was found to be unfit his parental rights could also have been
terminated under the neglect proceedings applicable to other Illinois parents,
thereby protecting the state interests as well as his constitutional rights. 1

In 1973, and with Stanley in mind, 17 the Texas Legislature gave statutory
recognition to the right of unwed fathers to service of citation on the
commencement of proceedings affecting the parent-child relationship. 18
Although the Texas Family Code excluded unwed fathers from the definition
of "parent,"' 19 a method of voluntary legitimization was provided to afford the

father an opportunity to claim parental rights. Under section 13.01(b) the
father may institute a suit for voluntary legitimation by filing a statement of
paternity with the Welfare Department; then, on the consent of the mother,
the managing conservator, or the court, a decree declaring the child to be the
legitimate child of the petitioner will be entered. 20

The Code further

provides a procedure for involuntary termination of the parent-child relationship, which by definition is applicable only to "parents" and apparently does

21
not apply to unwed fathers prior to voluntary legitimation.
The Texas Supreme Court held in In re K that the "biological father" of
an illegitimate child does not have an absolute right to voluntary legitimation
of his offspring. 22 In so holding, it construed the Texas Family Code as

14. Id. at 649, 658.
15. Id. at 652.
16. See id. at 658.
17. See Smith, Texas Family Code Symposium-Title 2. Parent and Child, 5 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 389, 405 (1974).
18. Tex. Laws 1973, ch. 543, § 11.09(a)(7), at 1416, as amended, TEX. FAMILY
CODE ANN. § 11.09(a)(7) (Supp. 1976).
19. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 11.01(3) (1975) defines "parent" as follows: "the
mother, a man as to whom the child is legitimate, or an adoptive mother or father, but
does not include a parent as to whom the parent-child relationship has been terminated."
20. Tex. Laws 1973, ch. 543, § 13.01(b), at 1421, as amended, TEX. FAMILY CODE
ANN. § 13.21 (Supp. 1976). This section provides a method for voluntary legitimation:
If a statement of paternity is filed with the State Department of Public Welfare,
the father, the mother, or the department may institute a suit for decree establishing
the child as the legitimate child of the person executing the statement. On the
consent of the mother, the managing conservator, or the court, and on the filing
of the statement of paternity with the petition, the court shall enter a decree declaring the child to be the legitimate child of the person executing the statement of
paternity.

21. Tex. Laws 1973, ch. 543, § 15.02, at 1426-27, as amended, TEX. FAMILY CODE
§ 15.02 (Supp. 1976). This section provides for termination of the parentchild relationship "with respect to a parent who is not the petitioner ...... (emphasis
added).
ANN.

22. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. 1976).
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providing the trial courts with discretion either to grant or deny consent to
23
It
voluntary legitimation in accordance with the best interests of the child.
is significant, however, that the best interests of the child are not mentioned

in the section governing voluntary legitimation proceedings. 2 4
Smith, one of the draftsmen of the Texas Family Code,

25

Eugene

stated that for the

court to withhold consent to legitimation for any reason other than those
specified in the termination section would amount to a refusal to recognize

an unwed father as a parent and therefore would be a denial of equal
protection. 26 The court in the principal case simply held that since S.D.A.
was not a parent, the trial court was not required to look to the specific

grounds for termination under section 15.02 in order to deny its consent to
legitimation.

27

The majority of the Texas Supreme Court took a narrow view of the
decision in Stanley.28 It distinguished the facts in the principal case from
those in Stanley by noting that Stanley had "sired and raised" his children,
while S.D.A. had "simply engaged in a single hit and run sexual adventure."' 29 The court apparently disregarded the fact that S.D.A. was prevented from establishing a familial relationship with the baby, since the original
action began only a few days after the birth of the child and while S.D.A.
was confined in prison.80 It has been suggested that the intangible concept
of a father's natural love and affection for his children should also be
considered in determining the unwed father's rights. 3 ' This concept was
disregarded in S.D.A.'s case, although at trial he had demonstrated his
concern, love, and affection for his child. 3 2 A concept which involves such
23. Id. at 170.
24. See Tex. Laws 1973, ch. 543, § 13.01(b), at 1421, as amended, TEx. FAMILY
CODE ANN. § 13.21 (Supp. 1976). The "best interests" standard is the test used in
determining questions of possession and access to the child (custody) in section 14.07.
TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 14.07(a) (1975). Besides specifying certain grounds for
termination of parental rights based on acts or omissions of the parent, the Code has an
additional requirement that termination is in the best interests of the child. Tex. Laws
1973, ch. 543, § 15.02, at 1426-27, as amended, TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 15.02 (Supp.
1976).
25. See Brief for Appellant at 11, In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1976) (identifying Professor Smith as the principal draftsman of the code).
26. Smith, Texas Family Code Symposium-Title 2. Parent and Child, 5 TEX.
TECHi L. REv. 389, 419 (1974).
27. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. 1976).
28. Compare Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52, 658 (1972), with In re K,
535 S.W.2d 168, 170-71 (Tex. 1976). A similar interpretation is found in Commonwealth v. Hayes, 205 S.E.2d 644, 647 (Va. 1974). Contra, In re R., 119 Cal. Rptr.
475, 483 (1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1014 (1975).
29. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. 1976).
30. See id. at 168-69.
31. In re P., 194 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
32. Brief for Respondent at 13, In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1976), which indicates that S.D.A. wanted the child because no one else could love it as much as he.
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basic rights should not have been so easily eliminated by the court.3
In order for a statutory classification to afford equal protection and
therefore be constitutional, it must bear some rational relationship to a
legitimate state interest. 4 The definition of "parents" in section 11.01
automatically establishes a classification for unwed fathers different from
that established for married parents, adoptive parents, and unwed mothers. 35
Because of the state's interest in securing good homes and families for
children, however, the Texas Supreme Court felt justified in making the
distinction between a father who has accepted a familial commitment and
one who has not.8 6
Undoubtedly, the state does have a legitimate interest in the welfare of its
children in custody disputes.8 7 But voluntary legitimation under the Texas
Family Code does not necessarily involve custody, although it does establish
paternity, thereby giving parental rights and duties to an unwed father.3 The Cole also provides that a suit for legitimation can be joined with an
action for termination of parental rights which would preclude any right to
custody. 39 The Supreme Court of California has recognized the importance
of distinguishing between custody actions and those involving a question of
biological paternity. 40 Citing Stanley, the California court said that precluding an unwed father from establishing that he is a child's natural parent is a
33. See In re P., 194 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
34. E.g., Frontiero v. Richardson, 411U.S. 677, 683 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas.
& Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76 (1971).
35. TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 11.01(3) (1975).
36. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. 1976). In a similar case, the Supreme
Court of Virginia determined the father in question was unfit under the best interest
standard. Commonwealth v. Hayes, 205 S.E.2d 644, 648 (Va. 1974). The court distinguished the facts before it from those in Stanley for various reasons, including the
fact that Virginia had no statutory definition of "parents" which excluded unwed fathers.
Id. at 647. There is no indication whether the court relied on the same grounds for
unfitness as would have been used to determine fitness of parents of legitimate children.
37. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972); In re P., 194 N.W.2d 18, 20
(Mich. Ct. App. 1972); Knollhoff v. Norris, 152 Tex. 231, 235, 256 S.W.2d 79, 82
(1953). The relevant Texas statute requires the court to look to the best interest of
the child in "determining questions of managing conservatorship, possession, and support
of and access to the child." TEX. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 14.07(a) (1975).
38. Tex. Laws 1973, ch. 543, § 13.03(a), at 1421, as amended, TEx. FAMILY CODE
ANN. § 13.23(a) (Supp. 1976).
39. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN. § 13.21(d) (Supp. 1976).
40. See In re R., 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, 483 (1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1014 (1975). This case involved a dependency action by the welfare department in
California. The child was presumed to be legitimate since her mother was married
when she was born, but subsequent to abandonment by the mother, and during the dependency proceeding, her biological father came forward to establish that he was the
natural parent. The lower courts had denied the father standing to allege parentage in
light of the presumption of legitimacy. The supreme court, however, interpreted Stanley
as requiring recognition of the natural father's constitutional right to establish paternity,
despite a presumption of legitimacy. Id. at 477, 485.
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denial of due process. 41 Furthermore, in weighing the state interest against
the private interest to determine the constitutionality of a decision denying
the right to establish paternity, "the balance to be struck is not obtained by
measuring the minor's welfare against appellant's interests. We measure
instead the state's narrower interest in precluding appellant from offering
evidence of parentage against his interest in establishing that fact, and the
'42
question of the child's welfare lies beyond the question of her parentage.
Public policy favors legitimacy ;43 thus, as the California court suggested, the
state's interest in removing the stigma of illegitimacy should also be considered.

44

In reaching its decision and concluding that a denial of S.D.A.'s petition
for legitimation was in the best interests of the child, the Texas court
apparently placed great emphasis on the fact that S.D.A. was currently in
prison. 45 It should be noted, however, that Stanley was also not a model
parent; one year after the landmark decision, his parental rights were
terminated under Illinois neglect proceedings. 46 Moreover, the dissenting
opinion in Stanley reveals that Stanley had informally relinquished custody
of his children shortly after the death of their mother and was not himself
seeking custody, but only wanted to prevent the Court from awarding legal
custody to others. 4 7 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court held that he was
entitled to the same constitutional right to a hearing on fitness as was granted
to other Illinois parents before parental rights could be terminated. 48 The
facts in Stanley support a broad interpretation of an unwed father's constitutional right to establish paternity, regardless of a subsequent fitness determination. 49 Whether the court in the principal case gives adequate recognition
to the requirement of a "powerful countervailing interest" needed to overcome the parent's interest as set forth in Stanley5" is unclear.
The dissent in K recognized constitutional problems in the majority
holding and felt that, since the Texas ,Family Code had been interpreted in -a
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. See
writ); Byrd

at 485.
at 484 (emphasis added).
C. v. W., 480 S.W.2d 474, 476-77 (Tex. Civ. App.--Amarillo 1972, no
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 275 S.W.2d 861, 863 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio

1955, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Courts have allowed various documents to show legitimacy.
See In re McNamara's Estate, 183 P. 552, 558 (Cal. 1919) (birth certificate signed by
father); Wall v. Altobello, 49 So. 2d 532, 533-34 (Fla. 1950) (hotel registration as
father and daughter); In re Home's Estate, 7 So. 2d 13, 16 (Fla. 1942) (letters referring
to "my daughter").

44. In re R., 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, 484 (1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1014

(1975).
45. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 169 (Tex. 1976).,

46.

H. CLARK, CASES & PROBLEMS ON DoMESTIc RELATIONS 284 (2d ed. 1974).
47. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 663 (1972) (dissenting opinion).
48. Id. at 658.
49. In re R., 119 Cal. Rptr. 475, 478, 485 (1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
1014 (1975).
50. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972).
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manner which treats unwed 'fathers differently from other parents, the
decision was violative of the equal protection clause as interpreted in
Stanley.5 1 Among the differences noted were that biological parenthood is
the test for maternal rights but not for paternal rights,5 2 that the biological
father is under a duty to support his illegitimate children but has no
correlative rights, and that an unwed father's rights may be terminated for
reasons other than the grounds required for termination of parental rights
under section 15.02. 5 3 The dissenting justices believed that biological
fatherhood, once established, should have entitled S.D.A. to a decree of
legitimation.5 4 Further, since a suit for legitimation could have been joined
with a suit for termination of the parent-child relationship,5 5 they believed
the proper procedure would have been to legitimate the baby based on
biological paternity and then to determine whether termination of parental
rights was appropriate. 5 6 While acknowledging the fact that S.D.A. would
they felt this did not justify circumhave problems retaining parental rights,
57
venting available statutory procedure.
Although the result of the case was correct insofar as it denied S.D.A.
custody oP his child, the means used by the court should be reviewed. The
court established a dangerous precedent by allowing judicial discretion in
legitimation proceedings and bypassing the termination procedure required to
determine the fitness of all other Texas parents.
Both Stanley and the principal case involved statutes which excluded the
unwed father from the definition of "parent."5 8 The Texas Supreme Court
interpreted Stanley as merely requiring a hearing on fitness in accordance
with the best interest standard, not as a decree that all unwed fathers have
fundamental parental rights.5 9 The statutory definition of "parents" in
Stanley raised a presumption of unfitness in unwed fathers which was
expressly found to be unconstitutional60 The Texas court's approval of the
procedure followed in K apparently indicates that before the unwed father
51. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 171, 175 (Tex. 1976).

52. Id. at 171. In 1975 the Texas Legislature amended chapter 13 of the Family

Code on voluntary legitimation to include a procedure for paternity suits, which is a
form of involuntary legtimation, under which the test for fatherhood is based on the
biological fact of paternity rather than on his fitness as a parent. TEX. FAMILY CODE
ANN. §§ 13.01-.09 (Supp. 1976). This apparently means if an unwed mother files the
suit, she must show biological fatherhood, while an unwed father must withstand
the best interests fitness standard.
53. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 171-72 (Tex. 1976).
54. Id. at 174.
55. TEx. FAMILY CODE ANN.§ 13.21(d) (Supp. 1976).
56. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 175 (Tex. 1976) (dissenting opinion).
57. See id. at 172.
58. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 650 (1972); In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 169
(Tex.1976).
59. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 171 (Tex. 1976).
60. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656-57 (1972).
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can legitimate his child, he must prove his fitness as a parent under the "best
interests" test. Since other parents are not required to prove their fitness
prior to obtaining parental rights, it appears that there is a presumption of
unfitness in unwed fathers in Texas which must be overcome before
voluntary legitimation will be granted."'
In custody matters the welfare of the child is paramount, and the rights of
the parents are enforced only when they are in accordance with the best
interests of the child.6 2 On the other hand, if there are other reasonable
ways to protect state interests, a state must choose the means which least
interferes with the individual's constitutionally protected rights. 3 In order
to protect the rights of all parties, the Texas Family Code should be
construed as requiring legitimation as a matter of law on the proof of
biological fatherhood and compliance with the voluntary legitimation requirements under section 13.01. Only then should the separate issue of
custody be determined under sections 14 or 15.02. The Supreme Court of
Texas refused to consent to legitimation of baby K because to do so would
not have been "in the best interests of the child." '64 Had the court allowed
S.D.A. to legitimate the baby, it could have terminated parental rights upon
proof of unfitness in the same proceeding under the termination statute. To
have done so would have avoided possible constitutional violations, yet
would not have jeopardized the state's interest in baby K's welfare.
Patricia E. Swanson
61. Post Argument Brief for Appellant at 7, In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168 (Tex. 1976)
stated that: "mhe unwed father has the burden to show the trial court . . . that he
is not only fit to be a parent, but also that his being a parent would be in the best interest of the child. He is ab inito [sic] presumed unfit in the Texas scheme and must
therefore obtain the "consent" of the mother, the managing conservator or the court.
. . . This presumption of unfitness was specifically overruled in Stanley."
62. In re P., 194 N.W.2d 18, 20 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971).
63. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 343 (1972).
64. In re K, 535 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. 1976).
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